The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar is significant only if Israel and Hamas use it to advance a ceasefire agreement and release the Israeli hostages while providing desperately needed supplies of food, fuel, and medicine to the devastated Palestinians.
This should be followed by a long-term ceasefire, during which an overall framework should be developed that would lead to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a process of reconciliation over several years, culminating in the establishment of a Palestinian state. Otherwise, if neither seize the opportunity, Sinwar’s assassination will be just another slaying of a Hamas or Hezbollah leader who is often replaced by even more radical leaders.
Hamas’ design to destroy Israel has proven to be almost suicidal, given the unprecedented massive destruction and death that Israel has inflicted on Gaza. Conversely, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s wish to attain a “total victory” over Hamas has proven to be an illusionary goal that can never materialize due to the very nature of Hamas’ ideology, structure, and enduring resistance. However, although both sides still hold the same position, they know that their ultimate objective of mutual destruction is untenable. The question is, where will they go from here?
It is well known that Netanyahu does not want to end the war, not because he believes he can win it but because of personal calculations, which will prove disastrous if he does not change course. Anyone who studied Hamas’ doctrine would attest that irrespective of the heavy losses and ruin they have sustained, they will survive as a movement. Hamas will continue to terrorize the Israelis from many fronts, especially from the West Bank, where they have a strong presence, even if they no longer govern Gaza, unless Israel recognizes the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, for which all Palestinians aspire.
For Netanyahu and his extremist government, however, the Palestinian demand is simply a non-starter. Instead of seeking a ceasefire, Netanyahu called on Hamas to lay down its weapons and surrender, fully expecting that Hamas would never capitulate. This is precisely what Netanyahu is counting on to justify the continuation of the war and, more than anything else, to stay in power. He is fearful that if he were to agree on a ceasefire, his government would collapse, as several ministers threatened to resign if he did. Moreover, once he is out of power, he will face a commission of inquiry about the October 7 attack, in addition to the three pending criminal charges against him that can send him to jail if he is convicted.
The question is, will Netanyahu put, for once, his country’s interests before his own by reaching a ceasefire as a first step toward ending the war in Gaza, winding down the hostilities with Hezbollah, and preventing further escalation of the hostilities with Iran? Notwithstanding their belligerent statements against Israel and their call for revenge for the killings of Sinwar and Nasrallah, Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s new leaders want to end the conflict, fearing further devastation. Iran, in particular, which is now bracing for a major retaliatory Israeli attack, is deeply concerned that the widespread regional violence could lead to a full-fledged regional war that inadvertently forces the U.S. to join the fray on Israel’s side, which Iran wants badly to avoid.
In the wake of Sinwar’s death, a new opportunity presents itself to reshape the governance in Gaza by allowing the Palestinian Authority under new leadership to take control. The Israeli forces should remain in Gaza to maintain security for 12-18 months, during which the PA will organize itself administratively with the support of the UN and other countries’ agencies.
Simultaneously, internal Palestinian security forces will be recruited, trained, and equipped by several aligned and non-aligned powers under UN peacekeeping supervision. Once this force is fully trained and ready, it will gradually take over security. Israel, too, would correspondingly withdraw its troops in stages but continue to collaborate on all security matters to allay its concerns and ensure sustainability.
Instead of demanding Hamas’ surrender, which is entirely a non-starter, Israel should make it clear that it will not oppose any Palestinian organization, including Hamas, which is willing to recognize Israel’s right to exist to join the PA in any future government in Gaza and the West Bank. Some would say that this is nothing short of rewarding Hamas for its attack against Israel. They are wrong. Israel has nearly decimated Hamas’ military capabilities and decapitated its leaders. It can now make such a gesture from a position of strength without humiliating the Palestinians because, in the final analysis, Israel must acknowledge Palestinian rights without compromising its security, but rather enhancing it.
I want to emphasize that regardless of how weaker and devastated Hamas is, their October attack and their fighting ability in the face of Israel’s military might have made them even more popular among the Palestinians, especially in the West Bank.
Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations, most recently at the Center for
Global Affairs at NYU. He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.